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Abstract—In this letter, two unmanned-aerial-vehicle (UAV)
optimal position selection schemes are proposed. Based on the
proposed schemes, the optimal UAV transmission positions for
secure precise wireless transmission (SPWT) are given, where the
maximum secrecy rate (SR) can be achieved without artificial
noise (AN). In conventional SPWT schemes, the transmission
location is not considered which impacts the SR a lot. The
proposed schemes find the optimal transmission positions based
on putting the eavesdropper at the null point. Thus, the received
confidential message energy at the eavesdropper is zero, and the
maximum SR achieves. Simulation results show that proposed
schemes have improved the SR performance significantly.
Index Terms—Secure precise transmission, three-dimension,
random-subcarrier-selection, direction modulation, machine
learning
I. INTRODUCTION
As an ideal candidate way to achieve secure wireless
transmission in physical layer [1]–[4], Directional modula-
tion (DM) has attracted extensive scholars’ attention due to
the characteristic that DM can transmit confidential signal
to a specific direction [5]–[10]. In general, DM technology
is implemented mainly by two methods. The first one is
implemented on radio frequency (RF) frontend which utilize
the phased array (PA) by optimizing the phase shifting [5]
[6]. The second method is implemented on the baseband by
utilizing orthogonal vector [7] [8] or beamforming operations
[9] [10]. As a further advance, to address the security problem
in conventional DM system which can not guarantee the secure
transmission in distance dimension, a DM method based on
frequency diverse array (FDA) [11]–[13] is proposed which
achieves secure precise wireless transmission (SPWT) [14]–
[17] in both direction and distance.
Nevertheless, the existing works on SPWT are based on
the scenario with fixed transmitter, receiver and eavesdropper.
In [17], it shows that the transmitter will form a main-
lobe around the receiver and side-lobes outside the receiver,
thus the position of transmitter also impact the transmission
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security a lot. Specifically, when the eavesdropper is located
on the side-lobe peak, the secrecy performance will reduce a
lot. Moreover, FDA-based SPWT scheme has increased the
complexity significantly. Based on this background, this letter
focus on the optimal transmission position without FDA. Our
main contributions are summarized as follows:
1) Considering an unmanned-aerial-vehicle (UAV) trans-
mission system with fixed receivers (desired user and
undesired eavesdropper) and a predetermined height
UAV transmitter, a 3D SPWT system with rectangular
transmit antenna array is proposed. Without frequency
diverse array (FDA), SPWT is achieved completely
based on DM which reduced the complexity. Then, two
transmission position optimization schemes in azimuth
dimension and pitch dimension are proposed, respec-
tively.
2) With the proposed schemes, artificial-noise (AN) is
unnecessary in this system. All the transmit power is
focus on transmitting confidential message while the
received confidential signal power at the eavesdropper is
zero. Thus, the memory for AN is unnecessary and the
complexity can be reduced. Simulation results show that
proposed schemes has the best secrecy rate (SR) than
the conventional scheme without transmitting position
selecting.
the remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Sec-
tion II, the proposed UAV SPWT system model is described.
Then the UAV position selection schemes are proposed in Sec-
tion III. Section IV presents the simulation and the analysis.
Finally, the conclusion is drawn in Section V.
Notations: In this paper,scalar variables are denoted by
italic symbols,vectors and matrices are denoted by letters of
bold upper case, bold lower case, respectively. Sign (·)T ,
(·)∗ tr (·) and (·)H denote transpose,conjugation,trace and
conjugate transpose respectively. ‖·‖ and |·| denote the norm
and modulus respectively. IM×N denotes the M ×N identity
matrix and E [·] denotes expectation operation.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
As shown in Fig. 1, the proposed SPWT system is composed
of an UAV transmitter Alice, a desired user Bob and an
eavesdropper Eve. Bob and Eve are equipped with a single
antenna. The UAV is equipped with a M × N rectangular
antenna array which has the same distance between two
adjacent antenna elements.
Then, taking Bob as the origin, the ray formed from Bob to











Fig. 1. System model for proposed scheme.
system is established. In this paper, we assume that Bob and
Eve are located on the ground, i.e. the Z axis coordinates of
Bob and Eve are 0. Alice is flying at a predetermined height g
and parallel to the ground. Moreover, the position of Bob and
Eve is known for Alice. Thus, the coordinate of Bob is defined
as (0, 0, 0), the coordinate of Eve is defined as (XE , 0, 0),
and the coordinate of Alice is denoted as (XA, YA, g). θA ∈
(0, 2π) is defined as the yaw angle of Alice which determines
Alice’s flight direction, take the positive direction of X-axis
as the reference direction and the counter clockwise direction
as the positive direction.
Based on the established rectangular coordinate system, the
angle relationship between Alice, Bob and Eve can be derived.

























(XA −XE)2 + (YA)2
. (4)











(XA −XE)2 + (YA)2 + g2
, (6)
where ϕB and ϕE satisfy 0 ≤ ϕB, ϕE ≤ π2 .
Since Alice is deployed with a M ×N rectangular antenna
array, we define the arrays parallel to the flight direction as
rows, and arrays perpendicular to the direction of flight as
columns. In the following, we use the subscript m,n to denote
the antenna in row m and column n.





[ej2πψ1,1 . . . ej2πψ1,N . . . ej2πψ2,1 . . . ej2πψM,N ], (7)
where θ and ϕ denote the receiver’s azimuth angle and pitch




[(m− 1)d cos θ cosϕ+ (n− 1)d sin θ cosϕ]
(8)
where fc is the central carrier frequency, d = c/(2fc)
denotes the element spacing in the transmit antenna array, and
c is the light speed. Substituting (θB, ϕB) and (θE , ϕE) into
(7) and (8), we can obtain the steering vector h(θB , ϕB) and
h(θE , ϕE), respectively.
In conventional baseband DM system, the transmit signal






where α denotes the power allocation factor, Ps is the total
transmit power, x is a complex signal symbol with E[|x|2] = 1,
v denotes the beamforming vector and w denotes the AN
vector.
In general, we set v = h(θB, ϕB) to maximize the received
confidential signal power at Bob, while w is set as
w = [I− h(θB, ϕB)hH(θB, ϕB)]z, (10)
to project the AN into the null space of Bob. z denotes the AN
vector which imposed consists of M ×N complex Gaussian
variables with power one, i.e., z ∼ CN (0, IM×N ).
In this letter, all the channels are set as the light of sight
(LOS) ones and the channel are unobstructed between the
transmitter and the receivers, which can be justified in UAV
communications. Moreover, without loss of generation, the
channel gain is set as 1 and phase compensation is employed
at the receivers. Based on this background, the received signal
























(1− α)PshHEw + nE . (12)
In (11) and (12), hB and hE are the abbreviation of
h(θB, ϕB) and h(θE , ϕE), respectively. nB and nE are the
additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with distributed as
nB ∼ CN (0, σ2B) and nE ∼ CN (0, σ2E), respectively.
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III. PROPOSED UAV POSITION SELECTION SCHEME
In conventional DM system, the desired receiver has the
maximum confidential signal power which is shown in (11).
However, this scheme can not guarantee a minimum confiden-
tial signal power at Eve which is related to hE , i.e., the relative
position of Eve, thus the security for confidential signal trans-
mission can not be promised. To maximize the security rate
(SR), we propose a optimal UAV position selection scheme to
achieve the maximum SR.
According to the definition of SR, we have
SR = log(1 + SINRB)− log(1 + SINRE). (13)






















ejπ[(m−1) cos θE+(n−1) sin θE ] cosϕE ·
e−jπ[(m−1) cos θB+(n−1) sin θB] cosϕB , (16)
when hHEhB = 0, the SINR at Eve is zero, which means the
maximum value of SR is reached. Then, we find the optimal
UAV position where the relative position of Eve lies on the
nulls of SINR. Since the azimuth angle and the pitch angle
are coupled, we derive the null points along the azimuth angle
dimension and the pitch angle dimension, respectively.
A. Azimuth angle dimension
According to (16), let ϕB = ϕE , the null points of



















jMπ(cos θE−cos θB) cosϕE − 1
ejπ(cos θE−cos θB) cosϕE − 1 ·
ejNπ(sin θE−sin θB) cosϕE − 1
ejπ(sin θE−sin θB) cosϕE − 1 . (17)
Let hHEhB = 0, we have,
Mπ(cos θE − cos θB) cosϕE = ±2kπ,
k 6= k′M(k′ = 1, 2, 3, . . .). (18)
or
Nπ(sin θE − sin θB) cosϕE = ±2kπ,
k 6= k′N(k′ = 1, 2, 3, . . .). (19)
Then, the relationship θE and θB can be obtained as,




k 6= k′M(k′ = 1, 2, 3, . . .). (20)
or




k 6= k′N(k′ = 1, 2, 3, . . .). (21)
Note that, the pitch angle satisfies the constraint of ϕB = ϕE .
According to (5) and (6), the X-coordinate of Alice must
satisfy XA = XE/2 and θB = π − θE . Moreover, the default
flight angle of Alice is 0, to satisfy sin θE − sin θB 6= 0
and cos θE − cos θB 6= 0, the flight angle of Alice should
satisfy θA 6= pπ2 (p = ±1, 2, . . .). Accordingly, (20) and (21)
is transformed as




k 6= k′M(k′ = 1, 2, 3, . . .). (22)
or




k 6= k′N(k′ = 1, 2, 3, . . .). (23)
According to the sum-to-product formulations, (22) and (23)
can be further transformed as
cos θB =
±k
M cosϕE cos θA
,




M cosϕE sin θA
,
k 6= k′N(k′ = 1, 2, 3, . . .). (25)
Note that cosϕE is a monotone increasing function about YE
in the range of (−∞, 0), while monotone decreasing in the
range of (0,+∞). Thus, 1
N cosϕE




about YE in the range of (−∞, 0), and is valued from 1N cosϕ0
to 1
N







Since θB is valued in (−π/2, π/2), we have cos θB ∈ (0, 1).
Thus, with a proper value of k, (24) and (25) must have
a solution. Then, the solution can be obtained easily by
dichotomy method or linear search method.
Based on this background, the Y-coordinate of Alice can be
obtained. With the obtained position of Alice, the SINR at Eve
is zero while the SINR at Bob achieves the maximum value.
Thus, we get the maximum value of SR, the transmission
security is guaranteed.
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B. Pitch angle dimension
Let θB = θE , the null points of array pattern along the pitch


















jMπ cos θE(cosϕE−cosϕB) − 1
ejπ cos θE(cosϕE−cosϕB) − 1 ·
ejNπ sin θE(cosϕE−cosϕB) − 1
ejπ sin θE(cosϕE−cosϕB) − 1 . (27)
Similarly, let hHEhB = 0, we have,
Mπ cos θE(cosϕE − cosϕB) = ±2lπ,
l 6= l′M(l′ = 1, 2, 3, . . .). (28)
or
Nπ sin θE(cosϕE − cosϕB) = ±2lπ,
l 6= l′N(l′ = 1, 2, 3, . . .). (29)
Then, the relationship ϕE and ϕB can be obtained as,




l 6= l′M(l′ = 1, 2, 3, . . .). (30)
or




l 6= l′N(l′ = 1, 2, 3, . . .). (31)
Note that, the azimuth angles satisfy the constraint of θB =
θE . According to (1) ∼ (4), the Y-coordinate of Alice must
satisfy YA = 0. Since the azimuth angle can be adjusted with
the flight angle of Alice, i.e. the flight direction which we
defined as θA, its value range is (0, 2π). The X-coordinate
range of Alice is (−∞, 0)⋃(XE ,+∞) while cosϕE−cosϕB
is a monotone decreasing function about XA. Let l = 1, it is
clear that when 2
M cos θE
< 0 or 2
N sin θE
< 0, the X-coordinate




0, the X-coordinate XA ∈ (XE ,+∞). Thus the value of XA
can be easily obtained by dichotomy method.
C. Performance analysis
With the obtained position of Alice in Section III-A or III-
B, the value of hHEhB is zero, which means the SINR at Eve
is zero, i.e., SINRE = 0. While at the same time, the SINR at





we get the maximum value of SR which is given by




Thus, the transmission security can be guaranteed. Moreover,
we can observe in (32), the power allocation factor should




The number of transmitter antennas (M ×N ) 4× 4
Total signal bandwidth (B) 5MHz
Total transmit power (P ) 1W
The height of Alice (g) 200m
The eavesdropper’s position (XE , YE ) (500m,0)
The flight angle of Alice (θA) π/4
Central carrier frequency (fc) 3GHz

























Proposed scheme in the azimuth angle dimension at the position of (250,76)
Theoretical SR of proposed scheme
Conventional scheme at the position of (300,200)
Conventional scheme at the position of (150,200)
Conventional scheme at the position of (300,-100)
Fig. 2. Curves of SR versus SNR for proposed azimuth dimension scheme
and conventional scheme.
maximum value log(1 + PS
σ2
B
). Thus, the AN in our proposed
scheme is unnecessary, which means all the transmit power is
used to transmit the confidential signal. Another benefit is that
the memory for AN can be omitted and reduce the budget, the
memory efficiency will be significantly improved.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed
schemes by numerical simulations. The default system param-
eters are chosen as shown in Table . By default, we assume
σ2B = σ
2
E . k and l in (24), (25), (20), and (21) are both set as
1.
Fig. 2 illustrates the curves of the SR versus SNR for pro-
posed azimuth-dimension scheme and three random position
with conventional scheme. Fig. 3 illustrates the curves of the
SR versus SNR for proposed pitch-dimension scheme and
three random position with conventional scheme. It is clear
to see that, when Alice is located at the position obtained by
the proposed schemes, the SR performance are better than
the positions obtained by conventional scheme. Moreover,
with the increase of SNR, the SR gaps between the proposed
schemes and conventional scheme are increasing. Furthermore,
the curves of derived theoretical SR of proposed schemes
versus SNR are shown in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3. Compared the
theoretical SR curve to the simulated one, the gap almost
disappear as the SNR increases. This verifies the validness
of our expression in (32).
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Proposed scheme in pitch angle dimension at the position of (527,0)
Conventional scheme at the position of (150,200)
Conventional scheme at the position of (300,200)
Conventional scheme at the position of (300,-100)
Theoretical SR of proposed scheme
Fig. 3. Curves of SR versus SNR for proposed pitch dimension scheme and
conventional scheme.
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Proposed scheme at the position of (527,0)
Proposed scheme at the position of (250,76)
Conventional scheme at the position of (300,200)
Conventional scheme at the position of (300,-100)
Conventional scheme at the position of (150,200)
Fig. 4. Curves of SR versus power allocation factor α for proposed scheme
and conventional scheme with SNR=15.
Fig. 4 shows the curves of the SR versus power allocation
factor α. Since the proposed two schemes have the fixed α =
1, the SR curves are horizontal lines. Although, the SR of
conventional scheme increases as the α increases, there are
still clear gaps between the conventional scheme and proposed
schemes. This verifies that, the UAV at the position with the
proposed schemes have the superior secrecy rate performance.
V. CONCLUSION
In this letter, we proposed two UAV optimal transmission
position selection methods. Compared to the conventional
methods, the proposed schemes have the superior secrecy
rate performance. Besides, the proposed schemes do not need
the aided AN, all the transmission power is used to transmit
confidential message, this increases the energy efficiency while
reduces the complexity and save the budget. From the analysis
and simulations, our proposed methods have much better SR
performance than conventional methods.
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